

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

**JACK LEVINE,
Bar No. 001637**

Respondent.

PDJ 2015-9003

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[State Bar No. 14-1151]

FILED: MARCH 9, 2015.

The undersigned Acting Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on February 25, 2015, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement. Accordingly:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Jack Levine is admonished for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents, effective thirty (30) days from this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$600.00.

DATED this 9th day of March 2015.

Mark S. Sifferman

**Mark S. Sifferman,
Acting Presiding Disciplinary Judge**

Copies of the foregoing were emailed/mailed
this 9th day of March, 2015, to:

Jack Levine, Esq.
Jack Levine, P.C.
777 E. Thomas Road, Suite 210
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
Respondent

Meredith Vivona, Esq.
Independent Bar Counsel
1501 W. Washington St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 North 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

By: JAlbright

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY
JUDGE**

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF
THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

**JACK LEVINE,
Bar No. 001637**

Respondent.

PDJ-2015-9003

**DECISION ACCEPTING
CONSENT FOR DISCIPLINE**

[State Bar File No. 14-1151]

FILED MARCH 9, 2015

On October 10, 2014, the Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee ("ADPCC") issued an Order of Diversion with the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program and Member Assistance Program pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 56, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. Respondent appealed the Order of Diversion and on November 24, 2014, ADPCC vacated its Order of Diversion and ordered the State Bar to file a formal complaint. The formal complaint was filed on January 7, 2015. An Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) was filed on February 25, 2015, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 57(a).

Supreme Court Rule 57(a) authorizes the filing of consent agreements with the presiding disciplinary judge ("PDJ") after the authorization to file a complaint.

Rule 57(a)(3)(B), specifically provides:

If the agreement is reached before the authorization to file a formal complaint and the agreed upon sanction includes a reprimand or suspension, or if the agreement is reached after the authorization to file a formal complaint, the agreement shall be filed with the disciplinary clerk to be presented to the presiding disciplinary judge for review. The presiding disciplinary judge, in his or her discretion or upon request, may hold a hearing to establish a factual

basis for the agreement and may accept, reject, or recommend the agreement be modified.

Supreme Court Rule 57 also requires that conditional admissions be tendered solely "...in exchange for the stated form of discipline..." The right to an adjudicatory hearing is waived only if the "...conditional admissions and proposed form of discipline is approved..." If the agreement is not accepted, the conditional admissions are automatically withdrawn and shall not be used against the parties in any subsequent proceeding. Rule 57(a)(4)(C), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

In this matter, notice of this agreement was provided to the complainant by email and telephone on February 12, 2015, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 53(b)(3). Complainant was also notified of the opportunity to file any written objection to the Agreement with Independent Bar Counsel within five days of bar counsel's notice. No objection has been filed.

In January 2007, Respondent was retained to recover damages for his client, the complainant, resulting from criminal charges of assault and trespassing. Respondent filed a complaint on behalf of his client on May 1, 2007. On October 3, 2007, a 150 Day Minute Entry Order was issued advising Respondent that the matter would be dismissed from the Court's inactive calendar on or after March 26, 2008, if Rule 38.1 was not complied with. Thereafter, due to inaction by Respondent, the matter was dismissed from the Court's inactive calendar on April 9, 2008. Respondent did not notify his client that his matter had been dismissed. Respondent then filed a motion for relief from the dismissal on April 22, 2008, and the matter was reinstated on June 11, 2008.

On May 1, 2009, the Defendant filed a Motion for Costs Bond and a subsequent Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 2009. Respondent filed a Motion to

Withdraw on May 11, 2009 and a Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment on May 27, 2009. Respondent, however, failed to file a Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond and failed to file a response in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond.

The Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond, Respondent's Motion to Withdraw, and Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment were granted on June 23, 2009. Thereafter, the Complainant's case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay costs bond.

Respondent conditionally admits to violating Supreme Court Rule 42, specifically, ER 1.3 (diligence) and ER 8.4(d) (engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent negligently failed to comply with the Court's 150 Day Order, which caused his client's matter to be dismissed. Although Respondent's inaction caused unnecessary delay, he was ultimately able to have the matter reinstated, thereby minimizing the injury to the client. Respondent further failed to oppose the Defendant's Costs Bond, which also caused his client unnecessary delay and impacted the administration of justice.

Pursuant to Rule 57(a)(4), the PDJ "shall accept, reject or recommend modification of the proposed agreement. The decision shall incorporate all or portions of the agreement, as appropriate." The rule requires the PDJ to independently weigh the conditional admissions and determine whether the sanction under those conditional admissions is appropriate.

In considering an appropriate sanction, the PDJ is guided by the American Bar Association *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards)*. The parties

stipulated the appropriate sanction in this matter is an admonition and the imposition of costs and expenses.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:

Independent Bar Counsel has not asserted any aggravating factors in this matter that may have been pursued if this matter went to hearing. Mitigating factors include 9.32(j) (delay in disciplinary proceedings), and 9.32(m) (remoteness of prior offense).

The Acting PDJ finds the parties have appropriately applied the *Standards* in arriving at the agreed upon sanction, accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED incorporating by this reference the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and any supporting documents by this reference. Respondent agrees to pay costs associated with the disciplinary proceedings in the amount of \$600.00.

IT IS ORDERED the Agreement for Discipline by Consent is accepted. A proposed final judgment and order was submitted simultaneously with the Agreement. Costs as submitted are approved for \$600.00. The proposed final judgment and order having been reviewed are approved. Now therefore, the final judgment and order is signed this date. Respondent is admonished.

DATED this 9th day of March 2015.

Mark S. Sifferman

**Mark S. Sifferman,
Acting Presiding Disciplinary Judge**

Copies of the foregoing mailed/mailed
this 9th day of March 2015.

Jack Levine
Jack Levine, P.C.
777 E. Thomas Rd., Suite 210
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Email: Levine2005@aol.com
Respondent

Meredith Vivona
Independent Bar Counsel
Office of the Arizona Commission
on Judicial Conduct
1501 W. Washington St., Suite 229
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Email: mvivona@courts.az.gov

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

by: JAlbright

Meredith Vivona, Bar No. 023515
Independent Bar Counsel
Office of the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct
1501 W. Washington St., Suite 229
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 452-3216
mvivona@courts.az.gov

Jack Levine, Bar No. 001637
Jack Levine, P.C.
777 E. Thomas Road, Suite 210
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
(602) 395-9000
Levine2005@aol.com

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

**IN THE MATTER OF A CURRENT
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA,**

**JACK LEVINE,
Bar No. 001637,**

Respondent.

PDJ 2015-9003

**AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE
BY CONSENT**

State Bar No. 14-1151

Independent Bar Counsel (“IBC”) and Respondent, who has chosen not to seek the assistance of counsel, hereby submit their Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. On October 10, 2014, the Attorney Discipline Probable Cause Committee (“ADPCC”) of the Supreme Court issued an Order of Diversion (Law Office Management Assistance Program and Member Assistance Program). Pursuant to Rule 55(c)(4)(B), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct, Respondent filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On November 24, 2014, ADPCC vacated its Order of Diversion. A formal complaint was filed on January 7, 2015. Respondent voluntarily waives the right to an adjudicatory hearing on the complaint, unless

otherwise ordered, and waives all motions, defenses, objections or requests which have been made or raised, or could be asserted thereafter, if the conditional admission and proposed form of discipline is approved.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., notice of this agreement was provided to the complainant by email and telephone on February 12, 2015. Complainant has been notified of the opportunity to file a written objection to the agreement with IBC within five (5) business days of IBC's notice.

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct, as set forth below, violated Rule 42, ER(s) 1.3 and 8.4(d). Upon acceptance of this agreement, Respondent agrees to accept imposition of the following discipline: admonition. Respondent also agrees to pay the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding. The State Bar's Statement of Costs and Expenses is attached hereto as **Exhibit "A."**

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Arizona having been first admitted to practice in Arizona on July 27, 1964.

2. Respondent's previous attorney discipline includes: (a) six-month suspension effective April 19, 1993 for violating Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ERs 3.1 and 4.4 as alleged in State Bar File 86-1450; and (b) censure under Agreement for Discipline by Consent for violation of Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 8.4(b) arising out of State Bar File 97-0325.

Fee Related Facts

3. On January 17, 2007, Complainant James Thiele (hereinafter "Complainant") hired Respondent to recover damages against the City of Phoenix and City of Phoenix employee, Michael Simmons, for assault and trespass. Complainant signed a fee agreement reflecting the scope of services dated January 17, 2007.

4. Respondent's fee agreement was a split fee agreement. Respondent charged \$125.00/per hour for his time, \$62.50/per hour for his legal assistant's time and a 20% contingency fee of any recovery.

5. The fee agreement provided that Complainant must pay a \$500.00 retainer payable upon execution of the agreement. "This retainer will be considered earned upon receipt."

6. Respondent deposited the retainer in his IOLTA. Respondent withdrew money from the IOLTA corresponding with bills sent to the client until the retainer was exhausted.

7. Respondent could not produce all of his time records, bills and/or invoices or accounting statements provided to the Complainant.

8. Respondent produced the following billing records for his time, totaling 4.5 hours, or \$500.00:

- a. 1/17/07 Initial Consultation (1.3)(Per quoted rate) \$100.00
- b. 1/17/2007 Preparation and dictation of memo (.2) \$25.00
- c. 3/21/2007 Attend conference an recorded statement of client (.8) & Preparation, dictation of memo re: recorded statement (.3) \$137.50

d. 4/10/2007 Preparation, dictation of letter to Arizona All Claims (.4)
\$50.00

e. 4/27/2007 Preparation, dictation of Complaint (1.5) \$187.50

9. Respondent could not produce all of his legal assistant's time records. Assistant AU's last billing entry was on May 30, 2007. The total amount of her services recorded in her billing entries was: 5.6 hours, or \$343.75 (.1 of her time was not charged).

10. The total amount of the bills Respondent produced is \$843.75.

11. Respondent asserts that Complainant, "owed me \$5,663.01."

12. Respondent was unable to explain how he arrived at \$5,663.01 and unable to justify the reasonableness of the charges.

Diligence Related Facts

13. On May 1, 2007, Respondent filed Plaintiff's Complaint. Both defendants answered by June 20, 2007.

14. On October 3, 2007, Court Administration entered a 150 Day Minute Entry Order stating, "If Rule 38.1 is not complied with, the case will be placed on Inactive Calendar on the date shown above [1/28/08] and it will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 38.1, without further notice, on or after March 26, 2008."

15. On April 9, 2008, due to Respondent's inaction, Complainant's case was dismissed from the Court's Inactive Calendar.

16. Respondent did not advise Complainant that his case had been dismissed from the Court's Inactive Calendar.

17. On April, 22, 2008, Respondent filed a motion for relief from the dismissal. On June 11, 2008, the case was reinstated.

18. Respondent did not advise Complainant of his efforts to have the case reinstated.

19. In his May 1, 2014 letter to IBC Respondent explained, "Unfortunately due to moving my office and a mix-up in calendaring to the 150 days dismissal date, his case was temporarily dismissed. . . . When I received notice that his case had been dismissed, I immediately undertook efforts to reinstate it."

20. Although in writing Respondent blamed missing the 150 Day Order Deadline on a calendaring "mix-up", in his July 1, 2014 email to IBC, Respondent explained:

Meanwhile I think I can explain the discrepancy between the billing statements which came out of my office. Putting the pieces together, I believe that what happened was that after the initial \$500 retainer was exhausted by my fees and costs, Mr. Theile made no further effort to pay my bills. At that point, I I [sic] am sure I told him that I would do nothing further on his case until he got caught up with his bill. I believe this explains why nothing was done on his case from May 2007 until April 2008 and it also serves to explain why I overlooked the initial dismissal of case for violation of the 150 day time limit. Of course when this occurred, I immediately took steps to reinstate the case in order to protect his interests.

21. On May 1, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion for Costs Bond. On May 6, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

22. On May 11, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw.

23. On May 27, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

24. Respondent had a good faith belief that his client had an argument regarding the constitutionality of the relevant statute raised in Defendant's May 1, 2009 Motion for Costs Bond.

25. Respondent did not file a Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond.

26. Respondent did not file a motion in opposition to defendant's Motion for Costs Bond.

27. On June 23, 2009, the Court issued three separate rulings. The Court: (1) granted Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond; (2) granted Respondent's Motion to Withdraw; and (3) granted Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the Time for Filing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

28. Complainant's case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay costs bond.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent's admissions are being tendered in exchange for the form of discipline stated below and are submitted freely and voluntarily and not as a result of coercion or intimidation.

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically ERs 1.3 [diligence: (1) Respondent negligently caused Complainant's case to be dismissed from the Court's inactive calendar; and (2) Respondent negligently failed to oppose Defendant's Motion for Costs Bond] and ER 8.4(d) [conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice: Respondent's failure to

comply with the 150 Day Order and his failure to respond to Defendant's Costs Bond motion caused unnecessary delay in Complainant's case.]

CONDITIONAL DISMISSALS

IBC conditionally agrees to dismiss claims that Respondent's conduct violated Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., Rule 42, ER 1.4 [communication] and ER 1.5 [fees], dismissing paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 of the Complaint.

RESTITUTION

Restitution is not an issue in this matter.

SANCTION

Respondent and IBC agree that based on the facts and circumstances of this matter, as set forth above, the following sanction is appropriate: admonition.

LEGAL GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF SANCTION

In determining an appropriate sanction, the parties consulted the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards)* pursuant to Rule 57(a)(2)(E). The *Standards* are designed to promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by identifying relevant factors that courts should consider and then applying those factors to situations where lawyers have engaged in various types of misconduct. *Standards* 1.3, Commentary. The *Standards* provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 33, 35, 90 P.3d 764, 770 (2004); *In re Rivkind*, 162 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990).

In determining an appropriate sanction consideration is given to the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the

misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. *Peasley*, 208 Ariz. at 35, 90 P.3d at 772; *Standard* 3.0.

The parties agree that Standards 4.44 and 6.24 are the appropriate Standards given the facts and circumstances of this matter. Standard #4.44 provides that, “admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.” Here, Respondent was negligent in failing to comply with the 150 Day Order, causing his client’s case to be dismissed from the court’s inactive calendar. Respondent was successful in getting the case reinstated and therefore, the client’s harm was limited to the unnecessary delay. Little actual injury was suffered due to Respondent’s negligence.

Similarly, Respondent negligently failed to oppose Defendant’s Motion for Costs Bond. Ultimately, the complainant’s subsequent counsel was able to address this issue on the merits. Still, Respondent’s negligence caused unnecessary delay in his client’s case.

Standard #6.24 provides that “admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engaged in an isolated instance of negligence in complying with a court order or rule and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party or causes little or no actual potential interference with a legal proceeding.” Here, Respondent’s diligence related negligent failures (described above) were prejudicial to the administration of justice where they resulted in unnecessary delay. Ultimately,

however, Respondent's client was able to be heard on the merits of the case and therefore, the damage Respondent caused was limited.

The Duty Violated

As described above, Respondent's conduct violated his duty of loyalty to his client and his duty to the legal system.

Respondent's Mental State

For purposes of this agreement, the parties agree that Respondent negligently missed the Court's 150 Day Deadline causing his client's case to be dismissed from the Court's inactive calendar; negligently failed to oppose Defendant's Motion for Cost Bond; and negligently impacted the administration of justice by causing unnecessary delay.

The Extent of the Actual or Potential Injury

For purposes of this agreement, the parties agree that there was limited harm to the client and limited harm to the legal system where Respondent's client's case was delayed but was ultimately decided on the merits.

Aggravating & Mitigating Circumstances

In Aggravation:

For purposes of this agreement, IBC will not pursue aggravating factors that it might otherwise pursue at a formal hearing.

In Mitigation:

(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings: here, the underlying events giving rise to the complaint occurred primarily between January 2007 and June 2009. The

Complaint was not brought until April 2014. Neither Complainant nor Respondent were able to produce the entire file and due to the passage of time, the witnesses' memories are not fresh.

(m) remoteness of prior offenses: Although Respondent has prior disciplinary offenses, they occurred in 1993 and 1997.

Further, although not an express mitigating factor provided by the *Standards*, Respondent is in the process of retiring and closing his practice. He intends to accomplish the closure of his law practice in March 2015. IBC considered this fact in determining what sanction is appropriate because it renders certain sanctions inapplicable and/or unnecessary.

Discussion

The parties have conditionally agreed that admonition would be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this matter. This agreement was based on the following: Respondent's conditional admission of his negligent errors that caused limited harm to his then client. Based on the *Standards* and in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, the parties conditionally agree that the sanction set forth above is within the range of appropriate sanction and will serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.


CONCLUSION

The object of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. *Peasley, supra* at ¶ 64, 90 P.3d at 778. Recognizing that determination of the appropriate sanction is the

prerogative of the Acting Presiding Disciplinary Judge, IBC and Respondent believe that the objectives of discipline will be met by the imposition of the proposed sanction of admonition and the imposition of costs and expenses. A proposed form order is attached hereto as **Exhibit "B."**


DATED this 25th day of February, 2015.

Independent Bar Counsel


Meredith Vivona


This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I acknowledge my duty under the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. I understand these duties may include notification of clients, return of property and other rules pertaining to suspension.

DATED this 20th day of February, 2015.


Jack Levine
Respondent

DATED this 20th day of February, 2015.


Approved as to form and content:



George Riemer
Executive Director,
Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct

DATED this 25th day of February, 2015.

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of the
Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the
Supreme Court of Arizona, this 25th day of February, 2015.

By: 

Kim Welch

EXHIBIT A

Statement of Costs and Expenses

In the Matter of a Current Member of the State Bar of Arizona,
Jack Levine, Bar No. 001637, Respondent

File No. 14-1151

Administrative Expenses

The Supreme Court of Arizona has adopted a schedule of administrative expenses to be assessed in lawyer discipline. If the number of charges/complainants exceeds five, the assessment for the general administrative expenses shall increase by 20% for each additional charge/complainant where a violation is admitted or proven.

Factors considered in the administrative expense are time expended by staff bar counsel, paralegal, secretaries, typists, file clerks and messenger; and normal postage charges, telephone costs, office supplies and all similar factors generally attributed to office overhead. As a matter of course, administrative costs will increase based on the length of time it takes a matter to proceed through the adjudication process.

General Administrative Expenses
for above-numbered proceedings \$ 600.00

Additional costs incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of this disciplinary matter, and not included in administrative expenses, are itemized below.

Staff Investigator/Miscellaneous Charges

Total for staff investigator charges \$ 0.00
TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED **\$ 600.00**



Sandra E. Montoya
Lawyer Regulation Records Manager

2-18-15

Date

EXHIBIT B

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA**

**IN THE MATTER OF A CURRENT
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA,**

**JACK LEVINE,
Bar No. 001637,**

Respondent.

PDJ 2015-9003

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER

State Bar No. 14-1151

The undersigned Acting Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed on _____, pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., hereby accepts the parties' proposed agreement. Accordingly:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Jack Levine, is hereby admonished for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents, effective thirty (30) days from this Order or _____.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$ _____.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings in the amount of _____.

DATED this ____ day of _____, 2015.

Mark S. Sifferman, Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk
of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this ____ day of _____, 2015.

Copies of the foregoing mailed
this ____ day of _____, 2015, to:

Jack Levine, Esq.
Jack Levine, P.C.
777 E. Thomas Road, Suite 210
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
Respondent

Meredith Vivona, Esq.
Independent Bar Counsel
1501 W. Washington St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 North 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266

By: _____